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Examination of various SIM cards and smart card devices indicates that data may be 
retained in SIM card memory structures even after heating to temperatures up to 
450
o
C, which the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
determined to be approximately the maximum average sustained temperature at desk 
height in a house fire.  However, in many cases, and certainly for temperatures greater 
than 450
o
C, the SIM card chip has suffered structural or mechanical damage that 
renders simple probing or rewiring ineffective.  Nevertheless, this has not necessarily 
affected the data, which is stored as charge in floating gates, and alternative methods 
for directly accessing the stored charge may be applicable. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ubiquity of mobile phone use in the general public can be an asset in crime scene 
investigations.  Many criminals and victims of crime will be carrying mobile phones, 
each with a unique Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card.  However, in some cases 
such as road traffic accidents and building fires, mobile phones may be significantly 
damaged, either mechanically or by high temperatures.  In addition, mobile phones 
have been used recently in a number of terrorist bomb attacks, both as detonators [1-
3] and for communication [4].  Data may be retained in even highly damaged phones 
and an ability to read this data could help identify the owner, place of purchase, last 
active location, or calls made and received [5, 6], which could provide vital assistance 
to investigators of these incidents [7].  Reading data from the memory of damaged 
SIM cards, and similar devices such as credit cards and some types of ID cards, will 
therefore assist in the identification of both victims of incidents and perpetrators of 
crimes.   
 
During forensic investigations, the most valuable part of an embedded system, such as 
might be found in a smart-card or a mobile phone SIM card, is the memory - in 
particular the non-volatile re-writable memory. This is usually implemented as an 
erasable electrically programmable read-only memory (EEPROM). Conventionally, 
data from the EEPROM are read using an interface on the same chip as the EEPROM, 
and a number of forensically sound techniques exist to study data in undamaged SIM 
cards [8].  In cases where the chip package has been damaged, and making contact via 
the attached interface is not feasible, data can be extracted by making electrical 
contacts on the surface of the chip itself.  However, this practice is becoming more 
and more difficult for a number of reasons, such as the likelihood of the chip being 
locked by a personal identification number (PIN) and the manufacturer’s unlocking 
code (PUK) cannot be obtained, and, in particular, because of the high likelihood of 
the chip being damaged during criminal activities, by fire, or during extraction.  
Figure 1 shows damage to a SIM card recovered from a waste-paper fire. 
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Data are held in a typical EEPROM memory in the form of individual data bits (0 or 
1) each consisting of charge stored on a floating polycrystalline silicon gate embedded 
in a silicon dioxide layer, shown schematically in figure 2. The floating gate is 
electrically isolated top and bottom by an oxide layer; the tunnel oxide is of thickness 
around 10nm, this is sufficiently thin to allow Fowler-Nordheim tunnelling of 
electrons from the gate to the source and vice-versa. Charge, typically 10
3
 to 10
5
 
electrons, is introduced onto the floating gate by applying a high voltage (typically 
12V) to a second control gate placed over the floating gate, and charge is removed by 
grounding the control gate and applying a positive voltage to the source [9, 10, 11]. 
The presence of charge on the floating gate modifies the conduction between a 
diffused source and drain in the underlying silicon substrate, and determining whether 
the source and drain are electrically isolated or connected by a high resistance 
conduction path allows discrimination between logical 1 and 0. Once in the floating 
gate, charge is held there by the large potential barrier formed by the surrounding 
oxide. The quality of the oxide is of paramount importance in producing reliable 
memory cells with long data retention times, and modern EEPROMs are capable of 
holding charge for several decades.  There is much research and development into 
different architectures and materials to produce faster, higher-density non-volatile 
memories [11-14] – however, these devices are currently used for digital photography 
and video capability, where these attributes are of primary importance [14]. 
 
Increased operating or storage temperature of EEPROMs and similar devices will 
cause a reduction in the data retention capabilities of the device, and recent research 
outlines a number of models for high temperature data loss [15] in addition to novel 
high-level devices for increased reliability in high operating temperatures [16]. 
However, damage by heat or fracture may cause a SIM card or similar device to 
become unreadable via the interface or through direct probing of electrical contacts or 
bit and word lines, but will not have necessarily compromised the stored data.  This 
work aims to ascertain if data is retained within a heat damaged SIM card or smart 
card, independently of the accessibility of this data via conventional methods.  We 
then outline alternative data extraction methodologies. 
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2. Experimental 
Samples of SIM cards currently and recently in use were collected from members of 
the public in Ireland, Sweden and the UK.  New SIM cards and similar smartcards 
were supplied by, or purchased from, networks or other distributors.  The sample set 
therefore represents a range of manufacturers including Infineon and ST 
Microelectronics, packaged by Gemplus and ACS. 
 
SIM cards, pre-programmed by the network with IMSI number etc, were further 
programmed using a converted Motorola phone to enter sample data such as numbers 
dialled, memorised contacts and text messages (it is worth noting that, depending on 
the phone model, size of memory, fraction of memory available etc, data may be 
stored either in the phone memory or on the SIM card).  Blank SIM cards and SIM-
type smart cards were programmed with sample data via an ACR38-1080 interface 
manufactured by Advanced Card Systems Ltd, or a similar SIM card reader device, 
connected to a PC.  
 
Damage to SIM cards can occur by mechanical means or when the cards are heated 
(such as in house fire or explosion) and further damage can be caused by the 
processing of the device prior to probing for data, such as the removal of epoxy and 
other packaging materials by the use of heated nitric or sulphuric acid [17].  
Decapsulation of SIM card chip, via any method, can cause mechanical damage to the 
chip, or reveal or exacerbate existing damage.  Even a low level of damage can render 
the chip unreadable via connection to a SIM card reader or simple probe station. 
 
For this study we minimised the possibility of damage to the circuitry, which would 
render rewiring or probing ineffective.  Before any heating occurred, the SIM cards 
were stripped of plastic moulding to expose the chip, which is further encased by a 
protective epoxy or plastic - the type varies depending on the model - and protects the 
chip and wiring that connect to the SIM card interface.  This casing can be removed 
with acid treatment as outlined above.  In some instances, the casing can be removed 
mechanically or by heating to temperatures not exceeding 160
o
C - some of the 
encasing materials become pliable as the temperature is moderately increased, and can 
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be more easily removed. Note that several different types of epoxy, plastic and other 
materials may be used in chip packaging; consequently, different protocols must be 
developed for the optimal removal of encapsulation, depending on the SIM card type. 
 
Chips were detached from the interface, extracted from the casing and then heated in 
ambient air to a range of temperatures.  Chips were held at their maximum 
temperature for approximately ten minutes and then cooled by removing from the heat 
source.  Following heating, the chips were attached to an interface pad using 
conductive paint, and rewired to the interface using a Kulicke & Soffa 4523 
wire/ribbon bonder.  The remounted chips were then read via the SIM card reader 
attached to mobile phone or PC. 
 
3. Results and Discussion  
 
3.1 Heat damage to SIM cards 
 
In this experiment, twelve decapsulated chips were studied: six heated to 
approximately 180
o
C, five to approximately 450
o
C and one to approximately 650
o
C.  
Of those that suffered no mechanical damage (assessed by light microscopy with 2x 
to 20x magnification) all those heated to temperatures up to 180
o
C could be read after 
rewiring, showing no loss of data.  One SIM card heated to approximately 450
o
C was 
rewired and fleetingly operated to retrieve data; however, most chips experiencing 
this temperature suffered damage rendering data reading by rewiring impossible; 
figure 3a shows an example of a SIM card chip heated to 450
o
C.  Above this 
temperature significant damage occurs which renders data retrieval by rewiring 
impossible.  Figure 3b shows a SIM card chip heated to 650
o
C, showing heat induced 
material damage and mechanical fracture.  
 
The experimental arrangement is deliberately artificial; all the material surrounding 
the chip is removed before heating, and therefore we present an idealised situation.  
Nevertheless, through this we show that the stored data can be read in instances where 
the chip is not mechanically damaged, and therefore propose that the data itself, 
stored as charge on floating gates, is not compromised by the heating process.  In real 
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situations, of course, a chip that has been exposed to such temperatures may also be 
mechanically damaged, and the data may not be retrieved by simple probing or 
rewiring - but the data itself remains uncompromised and can possibly be read using 
other techniques.  
 
This experiment demonstrates that the SIM card in this work retained data after 
heating to 450
o
C.  This is not necessarily indicative of all SIM card models, due to 
possible differences in the electronic architecture, which may affect data retention 
times.  However, the experimental results are supported by data published by 
manufacturers.  Most memory device manufacturers provide nominal data retention 
times for operation at room temperature.  In some cases, this can be extrapolated to 
operation times at different temperatures, using a variety of models.  For example, 
data retention times for the Texas Instruments flash memory used in the MSP430F 
microcontroller families are of the order of 100 years at room temperature; however, 
extrapolating information provided by the manufacturer using the Arrhenius equation 
[18], indicates that data loss is accelerated at higher temperatures, leading to a data 
retention time of about twelve days at 180
o
C, decreasing to approximately one hour at 
450
o
C.  As temperatures reach 750
o
C the retention time has reduced to a few minutes.  
This is a simple extrapolation, and some mechanisms for charge loss, such as a stress-
induced leakage current, or trap-assisted transport, may vary differently with 
temperature.  It nevertheless provides approximate figures and illustrates the trend of 
data retention with temperature. 
 
These experimental and manufacturers’ temperature figures compare favourably to 
the temperatures reported by Putorti and McElroy [19] in their experiment on a full 
scale house fire, fuelled by household furniture and accelerated with unleaded petrol 
and oil.  This experiment showed that the temperature experienced in such a fire 
varies with location within the house, and increases significantly with height.  The 
maximum temperature in the floor area, up to 15cm from the floor, is 166
o
C and 
temperatures here are in fact only maintained above 100
o
C for 90 seconds – indicating 
that phones in these locations will not suffer data loss due to heating effects.  At 
0.76m above the floor, approximately desk height, the temperature is sustained at an 
average of 450
o
C.  From the extrapolated figures it can be seen that data retention will 
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only become an issue for semiconductor memories that experience this temperature 
for approximately an hour or longer.  The maximum temperature obtained in the 
house is 738
o
C; this is obtained briefly, however, and temperatures are only sustained 
above 650
o
C for a maximum of 42 seconds, this duration occurring at a height of 
1.98m above floor level.  This is still less time than the extrapolated data retention 
time at this temperature; however, consideration should also be given to any 
additional exposure of the device to temperatures in the range 350
o
C – 650
o
C and the 
combined effects of this and the brief period above 650
o
C could in some cases result 
in temperature-induced data loss. 
 
It is worth noting that the temperatures given above are maxima and the house fire 
temperature is considerably reduced away from the source of ignition and highly 
combustible furnishings.  For example, in an adjacent room to that which experienced 
the maximum temperatures stated above, the desk height temperature does not exceed 
260
o
C and the floor area does not reach temperatures above 50
o
C [19], both 
comfortably allowing sustained data retention.  Other work [20] shows greater 
variation in recorded temperatures, due to various materials present, but data follows 
the trends outlined above. 
 
3.2 Data Reading Techniques 
 
Now that we have established experimentally that data may still be present in 
semiconductor memories that have been exposed to high temperatures, such as those 
encountered in domestic fires, we turn our attention to the feasibility of reading this 
data from chips that have been exposed to elevated temperatures and have suffered 
mechanical damage. An important point to note is that it is not always necessary to 
read all of the data held on a SIM card. In many cases, only a very small fraction of 
the data is necessary – for example, the IMSI number can yield valuable information 
linking the card and phone to a specific person and a particular location. 
 
A range of techniques exists for monitoring the operation of embedded 
microprocessors in order to access protected data or programmes during programme 
execution. Such techniques range from the non-invasive (probing the external 
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connections to a processor and monitoring power consumption during operation) to 
the highly invasive (such as fault induction [21]). The former group are referred to as 
side channel attacks, and rely on the ability to monitor unintended outcomes of 
processor operation; for example, it is possible to measure charge movement within 
processors using microscopic probes that detect magnetic fields around tracks (so-
called electromagnetic analysis, EMA).  A very simple method probes the time taken 
to perform certain arithmetic operations depending on the size of the data being 
operated on; however, as an elementary fraud countermeasure, current generations of 
smart cards are designed so that the time taken for different processes is the same. 
 
Recent techniques addressing the problem of protecting systems using a combination 
of cryptographic and physical protection systems have relied on the un-accessed 
memory being secure [22], and concentrate on protecting the processor during 
operation. 
 
The emphasis is thus on protection of operating processors and preventing attacks 
aimed at determining the contents of secure memory via ascertaining the structure and 
operation of the processor, rather than those directly aimed at detecting static charge 
in the EEPROM cells. 
 
Most of these techniques require the removal of passivation, metallisation, and control 
gate from the EEPROM. Well-established methods exist to achieve this; however, 
removal of the upper layers can cause degradation of the charge retention 
characteristics of the target chip before enough material has been removed to allow 
probing methods access to read any charge on the floating gate [23]. In addition, and 
potentially more seriously, in-built chip security measures may detect such an attack; 
for example, optical sensors and capacitive sensors to detect the passivation layer are 
sometimes built into systems to prevent successful reverse engineering [17, 24]. 
 
An alternative to these methods is to access the memory via etching the backside of 
the wafer and apply electrical scanning probe microscopy (SPM) methods such as 
scanning capacitance microscopy (SCM) or scanning Kelvin probe microscopy 
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(SKPM) to read the charge in individual floating gates, each corresponding to one bit.  
This has been used successfully in the past as a failure analysis technique for space 
science applications [23], and has the advantages of not requiring the upper circuitry 
to remain intact - thereby circumnavigating some security countermeasures - and is 
operable even if only fragments of the chip are available.  This may, therefore, be a 
useful technique to detect the data that the current study shows is retained as charge 
even in damaged chips.  However, there are considerable drawbacks in such 
techniques, including the very slow read speed, damage to cells during the preparation 
process, leakage of charge following preparation [25] which compromises the 
integrity of any data retained – and, lastly, the descrambling of the binary contents of 
the memory array into meaningful data.  Such a method may therefore be useful, after 
development, for extracting the small amounts of data from a SIM card, but would be 
unsuitable for large capacity devices, such as Flash memory drives. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We have shown that data may be retained in EEPROM memory devices such as SIM 
card memory, even when the SIM card chip is subjected to a temperature up to 
~450
o
C.  This is approximately the maximum average sustained desk height 
temperature in a house fire, and is significantly above the maximum floor temperature 
of 166
o
C [19].  In some cases the data is retrievable by rewiring the chip or by making 
direct contact to the chip surface.  However, in the majority of cases, chips heated to 
450
o
C or above will suffer additional damage to the top surface or circuitry, or 
experience some mechanical damage.  In these cases, although the data is retained in 
the memory, the data cannot be read by rewiring or with a conventional probe station, 
and an alternative technique, such as direct probing of the stored charge, needs to be 
employed to access the retained data.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. SIM Card recovered from waste-paper fire 
 
 
Figure 2. Cross-sectional schematic of a basic EEPROM. The poly-Si control gate 
and metallisation lie above the poly-Si floating gate, which is isolated in an oxide. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. a) and b) Optical micrographs showing damage to SIM card chips by 
exposure to temperatures of a) ~450
o
C and b) ~650
o
C; 
